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DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2012). 416 PP.
One of us has tacked a cartoon to the office door that shows three
elderly gentlemen holding cocktails, obviously ill at ease in each other’s
company—one looking down, a second glancing up, and a third whose gaze
seems adrift. The caption reads, “A psychologist, a lawyer, and a shoe
salesman attempting to mingle at a cocktail party.” This is obvious
hyperbole because, as everyone knows, shoe salesmen can talk to all sorts
of people,1 and as we will show, psychologists and lawyers have much to
discuss.2 Two recent books, Jury Decision Making: The State of the
*

Edie Greene is Professor and Chair of Psychology and Director of the Graduate
Concentration in Psychology and Law at the University of Colorado in Colorado Springs.
She is lead author of Psychology and the Legal System (2014) and Determining Damages:
The Psychology of Jury Awards (2003) and has published approximately seventy-five
articles related to jury decisionmaking in scholarly journals, law reviews, or edited books.
** Brian H. Bornstein is Professor of Psychology and Courtesy Professor of Law at the
University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has published over 130 articles on jury decisionmaking
and related topics, and he has authored or edited eight books. His latest book is Stress,
Trauma, and Wellbeing in the Legal System (with Monica K. Miller, 2013).
1 See, e.g., Annie Favreau, Chatterbox Careers: 7 Jobs for Talkative People,
BRAZENCAREERIST.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), http://blog.brazencareerist.com/2011/08/16/
chatterbox-careers-7-jobs-for-talkative-people/.
2
See, e.g., Randall W. Engle, Comment from the Editor, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of psychological scientists in legal
scholarship); see also EDIE GREENE & KIRK HEILBRUN, WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2013); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:
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Science3 by Dennis J. Devine and In Doubt: The Psychology of the
Criminal Justice Process4 by Dan Simon, powerfully illustrate this
symbiosis. Although the books are bidirectional in the sense that they
present psychology’s role in legal processes as well as legal implications for
the field of psychology,5 their emphases are decidedly on how
psychological research can be used to improve legal policy, procedure, and
practice.
To explore how legal processes and procedures can be improved
through the use of research findings, we borrow the concept of “nudging,”
popularized in the book entitled Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness.6 Authors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein
show that by considering the complex and occasionally irrational ways that
people think, one can offer choices that make it easier for people to reach
optimal decisions. We extend this thinking into the legal realm and show
that Devine’s and Simon’s books both offer scientifically based, pragmatic
alternatives to procedures and practices that currently hamper fair and
efficient legal decisionmaking. We suggest that both Jury Decision Making
and In Doubt show how legal decisions can be enhanced through science.
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LAW
In Jury Decision Making, Devine, an associate professor of
psychology at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, provides
the most thorough and comprehensive collection to date of the large body
of psychological scholarship on the variables that influence jury decisions.
Specifically, he cites the many methodological and theoretical contributions
of psychologists to understanding jury decisionmaking. These include: (1)
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations
of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1675 (2011) (“Never has law
relied as heavily on psychology as it does today.”).
3
DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE (2012). One of
us (Bornstein) is currently coeditor of the New York University Press book series on
psychology, crime, and law, which published Jury Decision Making. However, he became
an editor after the book was already in production, and he had no role in the book’s
selection, editing, or publication.
4 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012).
5
This type of reciprocal relationship is described in Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene,
Jury Decision Making: Implications for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 63 (2011). In the context of jury decisionmaking, the relationship is
reciprocal because jury trials provide a setting for testing psychological theory regarding
reasoning, judgment, decisionmaking, persuasion, stereotyping, and group behavior; and
psychological research findings have informed and influenced trial practices.
6
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5–7 (2008).
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trial practices related to jury size, decision rule, jury selection, and judicial
instructions; (2) the effects of trial context, including exposure to pretrial
publicity and inadmissible evidence and varying verdict options and
standards of proof; (3) characteristics of trial participants, such as
defendants’ attractiveness, remorse, and prior records, and jurors’
dogmatism, beliefs about the legal system, and approaches to evaluating
evidence presented at trial; and finally, (4) aspects of the evidence,
including its strength and issues specific to evidence from eyewitnesses,
experts, and scientists. Devine relies on data from simulated and real juries
alike on questions pertinent to both criminal and civil issues and includes
studies of both individual jurors and interacting groups.
Devine claims that because there have been relatively few attempts to
tie together this large body of empirical research,7 his primary goal was to
“gather the many findings about juries and synthesize them into an
overarching theoretical framework.”8 Hence, the book’s most original
contribution is his integrative, multi-level theory of jury decisionmaking
that is fleshed out in the second half of the book. As its title suggests, the
theory proceeds on two levels of decisionmaking: by individual jurors and
within the jury as a whole.
Devine analogizes an individual juror’s decisionmaking to that of a
film director who begins the process of shooting a film (reaching a
decision) with a script in mind, forming images (in the juror’s case, mental
images) of the components of the story, and eventually arriving at a final
cut (an individual, preliminary verdict preference). In the process, footage
(evidence) that does not adhere well to the narrative being developed will
be discarded, left on the cutting-room floor. Any ambivalence about the
7

A few algebraic and stochastic models of individual jurors’ decisions were developed
in the early years of scholarship on jury decisionmaking. See, e.g., Thomas M. Ostrom et al.,
An Integration Theory Analysis of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 436 (1978); Ewart A. C. Thomas & Anthony Hogue,
Apparent Weight of Evidence, Decision Criteria, and Confidence Ratings in Juror Decision
Making, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 442, 443–44 (1976). To date, the most influential theory
describing how individual jurors reach decisions is the story model, which focuses on the
manner in which jurors form narrative accounts of the evidence. See Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 242, 243–45 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation];
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189–93 (1992)
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Tests of the Story Model]. Various jury-level models
focus on the distribution of verdict preferences in a group. See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, Social
Transition Schemes: Charting the Group’s Road to Agreement, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 684, 689 (1981).
8
DEVINE, supra note 3, at 2.
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cohesiveness of the narrative will trigger the construction of alternate
endings—as disgruntled moviegoers can readily attest—or, in the jurors’
case, of alternative narratives.
Readers familiar with the influential story model developed by Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie in the 1980s and 1990s9 might well ask how
Devine’s model differs from that. Although the story model invokes
notions of jurors’ expectations regarding how stories are constructed,
Devine has more to say about the importance of jurors’ cognitive structures,
termed schemas, including event-related constructions termed scripts and
person-related constructions termed stereotypes. Devine articulates several
other subcomponents of this part of his model, including the role of
defendant characteristics, individual differences among jurors, and the
persuasiveness of the prosecution’s or plaintiff’s evidence based on its
scope, credibility, and singularity.
When deliberations begin, the process of decisionmaking shifts to
“story sampling,” in which jurors share their personally constructed stories,
and the group as a whole samples from these offerings. The likelihood that
any individual juror’s story will emerge as the preferred, shared verdict
depends on that juror’s status within the group and on the nature of his or
her contributions (i.e., wholly constructed stories are more persuasive than
scattered thoughts, observations, or questions). The nature of verdictfavoring factions, including their size, the effectiveness of their leaders, and
the cohesiveness of faction members, also matter. The jury-related aspects
of this model are, in our opinion, the particularly important contributions of
Devine’s theorizing, because jury behavior has been studied much less
intensively than individual jurors’ cognitive processes. Devine’s model
impressively combines previously distinct concepts, such as minority and
majority influence, normative and informational social influence, social
sharing of information, and deliberation style. In addition, it suggests a
number of novel and testable predictions that should keep Devine and other
jury scholars busy for years to come.
In In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process, Simon, a
professor of psychology and law at the University of Southern California,
reviews psychological research to explain why the predictable irrationality
of human thought processes diminishes the accuracy of evidence gathering
and verdict determinations. He also suggests ways to rectify this situation.
Simon’s approach is simultaneously narrower and broader than Devine’s:
narrower in that it focuses solely on the criminal justice system and
9

Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 7, at 243–45; Pennington &
Hastie, Tests of the Story Model, supra note 7, at 189–93.
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excludes civil law, yet broader in that it covers the psychological processes
involved not only in jury decisionmaking but in a number of other
important contexts, such as police investigations, interrogations, and
eyewitness testimony. Because a relatively small number of criminal (as
well as civil) disputes ultimately wind up before a jury, this scope makes
the subject matter of In Doubt relevant to a large number of legal actors,
including the police who investigate crimes, the witnesses, suspects, and
defendants who provide evidence, and the judges and jurors who serve as
fact finders at trial. As Simon observes at the book’s outset, “[o]ne of the
obvious features of the criminal justice process is that it is operationalized
mostly through people: witnesses, detectives, suspects, lawyers, judges, and
jurors. . . . Criminal verdicts can be no better than the combined result of
the mental operations of the people involved in the process.”10 We consider
concerns about the mental operations of these legal players throughout this
Review.
Simon’s book goes on to examine many of the ways in which those
mental operations can, and often do, diminish the accuracy of the process in
terms of how the evidence is obtained and used and how that evidence
influences verdicts. Simon describes that investigators, in their zeal to
resolve cases, can make premature judgments that confirm their suspicions
about suspects’ involvement, assess suspects’ truthfulness incorrectly, and
conduct interrogations that coerce suspects into confessing falsely. The
mistakes can continue when investigators interview eyewitnesses about
their memories for details of crimes and identification of the perpetrators as
well as during trials when those same eyewitnesses can exert inordinate
influence on jurors’ judgments. The chapter on fact-finding at trial, in
which this book overlaps most with Jury Decision Making, makes the
important point that jurors overweigh factors that have little to no predictive
value (e.g., eyewitness confidence) while being relatively insensitive to
factors that do predict witness accuracy (e.g., witnessing conditions).11
In In Doubt, Simon does an admirable job of summarizing a large
volume of literature in a relatively short space. He also provides some
prescriptions for remedying errors. Underscoring the emphasis on
practicality, each chapter concludes with a useful set of recommended
reforms, about which we will have more to say. As the author
acknowledges, some of these reforms would require systematic changes
(e.g., shifting investigative incentives from clearing crimes to seeking the
10

SIMON, supra note 4, at 2.
See, e.g., Melissa Boyce et al., Belief of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 501, 510–11 (R. C. L.
Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE HANDBOOK].
11
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truth), whereas others are legally complex (e.g., allowing more expert
testimony on topics like false confessions and eyewitness memory). But
still others are quite feasible and straightforward, such as recording witness
interviews and suspect interrogations and thereby increasing transparency
throughout the process. Simon argues persuasively that the reforms would
improve the accuracy of the criminal justice process and thereby reduce the
incidence of false convictions, cases that he uses effectively to illustrate
some of the problems with the system in its present form.
That Simon’s book is short on methodological and statistical details
will make it less useful to researchers in the field than Devine’s book,
which contains more of the methodological nitty-gritty. Conversely, it
should be more appealing to a lay audience, including practitioners (e.g.,
attorneys, judges, police) and policymakers. Taken together, these two
books make it abundantly clear that psychological theorizing and
experimentation have much to offer the law.
But is the legal system listening? The data on this point are mixed.
Eyewitness researchers in particular have had some notable successes
lately, as demonstrated by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Henderson, in which the court recognized and accepted the results
of empirical research studies, and revised its standards for assessing
eyewitness evidence and instructing jurors in cases involving eyewitness
It also supported the increasing admissibility of expert
memory.12
testimony on eyewitness memory.13 However, courts have been slower to
adopt changes based on research on other topics, such as jurors’ difficulty
understanding and applying jury instructions.14
II. ADDING BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS TO THE MIX
Let’s return to that cartoon. Imagine that an economist has taken the
place of the shoe salesman. Would that trio—the lawyer, the psychologist,
and the economist—be likely to converse? Based on the growing body of
empirical research that relies on experimental methodologies and theories
of psychology to understand individual and group choices and judgments of
relevance to the law—the field of behavioral law and economics—we
suspect that the answer would be a resounding “yes.”
12

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 912–14 (2011).
Id.; see also Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Has Eyewitness Research Penetrated the
American Legal System? A Synthesis of Case History, Juror Knowledge, and Expert
Testimony, in THE HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 453, 456–58.
14
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 4, at 184–91; Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious
Little Guidance: Jury Instructions on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743,
745–47 (2000) (describing ambiguity of jury instructions on damage awards).
13
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Over the past forty years, psychologists have observed that humans
deviate in predictable ways from rational choice theory—the approach, long
dominant in economics and increasingly prominent in sociology, political
science, and criminology, that assumes individuals’ choices are internally
coherent and logically consistent with their biases and preferences.15 At its
most basic level, rational choice theory assumes that all decisions and
actions are fundamentally rational in nature.16 Yet through empirical
research in many domains, including police stations,17 lawyers’ offices,18
and courtrooms,19 psychologists have learned that people rely on heuristics
and biases that are often useful in simplifying decisions but that lead to
judgmental errors and deviations from rationality.20 A straightforward
example in the law is this: because jurors make decisions about a
defendant’s liability in hindsight (i.e., after learning that a plaintiff has been
injured, allegedly due to some (in)action on the part of the defendant), their
verdict is likely to be influenced by their knowledge of the consequences of
the defendant’s actions.21 In Jury Decision Making, Devine neatly
summarizes other instances in which trial-related procedures or individualdifference variables influence outcomes, often in predictably irrational
ways, and he provides effect sizes—the strength of the relationships among
15

See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 364, 364 (1995).
See id.
17
See, e.g., Lori H. Colwell et al., US Police Officers’ Knowledge Regarding Behaviors
Indicative of Deception: Implications for Eradicating Erroneous Beliefs Through Training,
12 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 489, 491–92 (2006).
18
Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher
Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
159, 162–67 (2002); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability
to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 137 (2010).
19
Andrew J. Evelo & Edie Greene, Judgments About Felony-Murder in Hindsight, 27
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2013); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post
≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 93 (1995); C.
Neil Macrae, A Tale of Two Curries: Counterfactual Thinking and Accident-Related
Judgments, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84, 85 (1992). But see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
72, 75–76 (2011).
20
Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1686 (noting that “in many important instances, people
pull the wrong cognitive tools out of their adaptive toolboxes”).
21
Marylie Karlovac & John M. Darley, Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A
Negligence Law Analogy, 6 SOC. COGNITION 287, 289–91 (1988); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Lee
Roy Beach, Human Inference and Judgment: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34
STAN. L. REV. 939, 949 (1982) (“If the jurors use their newly acquired knowledge to judge
what the defendant . . . should have known at the time of the accident, they may be more
likely to find the [defendant] negligent—a verdict that may be substantially different from
one arrived at in the absence of this knowledge.”).
16

1162

EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN

[Vol. 103

variables—and an assessment of the extent of support in the scholarly
literature. Both of these concepts are useful to academic researchers.
Deviations from rational choice theory raise practical concerns about
how well laypeople and even some experts can assess choices and make
judgments. As Simon explains throughout In Doubt, cognitive errors
related to legal decisions mean, among other things, that detectives rely on
confirmation biases in criminal investigations,22 criminal jurors are overly
reliant on eyewitnesses’ stated confidence in their identifications,23 civil
jurors anchor their monetary judgments on the damage awards suggested by
counsel,24 trial attorneys undervalue the opinions of other lawyers in
predicting potential jury verdicts,25 and judges have difficulty disregarding
inadmissible evidence.26
Importantly, though, these deviations into apparent irrationality are, to
a large extent, predictable, so procedural rules can be designed to reduce
their impacts and prevent them from affecting the outcomes of adjudication.
But this begs two questions: Which legal decisions are likely to be affected
by cognitive biases, and how dramatically can and should the relevant
procedures be changed to address this predictable irrationality?
Simon tackles these questions in the context of criminal investigations.
He first articulates the mechanisms that can bias criminal investigators’
judgments and then artfully considers ways to revise investigative
procedures to counter these biases. In so doing, Simon raises the
possibilities that a) investigators could be forced to consider alternative

22
Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators’
Judgments of Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 583–84 (2007); Karl
Ask et al., The ‘Elasticity’ of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias, 22
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1258 (2008).
23
Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness
Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361 (2002); Elizabeth
R. Tenney et al., Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis for Witness Credibility, 18
PSYCHOL. SCI. 46, 49 (2007).
24
EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JURY AWARDS 150–56 (2003); Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are
Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 164, 171 (2010). See also Jennifer K.
Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361–62 (1999).
25
Jonas Jacobson et al., Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and Misuse)
a Second Opinion, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 113 (2011).
26
Such evidence includes demands disclosed in settlement negotiations, conversations
protected by attorney–client privilege, and rape victims’ prior sexual histories. Andrew J.
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1283, 1330–31 (2005).
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hypotheses and explain why they should be rejected,27 and b) some team
members could offer countertheories to the prevailing hypothesis and spur
debate about the strengths and weaknesses of these different options.28 He
also proposes a far more feasible procedure for enhancing the objectivity of
criminal investigations: electronic recordings. Simon suggests that all
interactions between investigators and witnesses should be recorded and
preserved in their entirety, careful records should be made of all other
investigative procedures, including those that lead to deadends, and the
complete record of these activities should be made available to all parties
involved in cases. According to Simon, the result of creating a complete
record of an investigation is a reduction in its adversarial intensity as well
as enhanced accuracy and transparency. With an awareness that their
decisions would be exposed to outside observers, investigators would
adhere to best (or at least better) practices and be deterred from
misconduct,29 and law enforcement agencies would be incentivized to
provide up-to-date training and oversight.
Devine provides other examples of legal decisions that are beset by
cognitive bias, and he too suggests a number of procedural remedies. For
instance, joinder of criminal charges biases jurors’ judgments against a
defendant because jurors attribute multiple instances of wrongdoing to a
defendant’s criminal disposition and confuse evidence relevant to multiple
charges. Devine warns that joinder should be used cautiously and, when
feasible, avoided altogether. Devine describes studies which show that
when multiple charges are leveled against a defendant in a single trial,
jurors are unable to compartmentalize the evidence and consider each
charge on its own merits. Rather, they become confused about which
evidence is associated with which charge and make negative dispositional

27

Although the likelihood seems small that investigators would be willing to engage in
lateral thinking and generate alternative hypotheses, detectives in the United Kingdom are
encouraged to do so. See NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICING EXCELLENCE, PRACTICE ADVICE ON
CORE INVESTIGATIVE DOCTRINE 2005, at 22–23 (2005). Police officers in Canada have been
ordered to take into account “all the information available” and to disregard evidence only if
they determine that it is unreliable. See Dix v. Canada, 2002 ABQB 580, ¶ 357 (Can.).
28
This procedure has been shown to reduce commitment to a previously made choice.
Charles R. Schwenk, Effects of Devil’s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry on Decision
Making: A Meta-Analysis, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161,
163, 168 (1990). It can also reduce “groupthink,” whereby social pressures within a group—
especially a group with a clear and strong leader—can stifle debate and lead to suboptimal
decisions. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).
29
Saul M. Kassin, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: The Fifth Rule, 22 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 649, 652 (1998).
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inferences about the defendant that increase the likelihood of conviction.30
Devine considers but discards the possibility that a simple procedural
reform, namely a limiting instruction, could effectively debias these
judgments. (Such an instruction would tell jurors to consider only the
evidence that is directly relevant to the particular charge for which it
applies.) Unfortunately, limiting instructions on this issue—like limiting
instructions in general31—have been shown to have little effect on
eliminating bias.32 Hence, a better procedural recommendation is for judges
to sever charges and reduce the likelihood that jurors will make adverse
dispositional attributions of defendants charged with multiple offenses.33
Simon and Devine both write about the likelihood that jurors’
decisions regarding a defendant’s guilt can be influenced by the confidence
with which a prosecution eyewitness identifies the defendant as the
perpetrator. In one study, the confidence expressed by the eyewitness was a
stronger predictor of jurors’ verdicts than the accuracy of the
identification.34 Witnesses who learn that another person has identified the
defendant as the perpetrator35 and receive otherwise confirming feedback
from a lineup administrator36 show increased confidence in the accuracy of
their identifications—even when that information is fictitious. Such

30

Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of
the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 349–50 (1985); Edith
Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
193, 204–06 (1985); Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The
Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 319, 332–35 (1985).
31
DEVINE, supra note 3, at 61.
32
See, e.g., Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror
Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 761 (1984);
Greene & Loftus, supra note 30, at 203–04.
33
Edie Greene & Leslie Ellis, Decision Making in Criminal Justice, in APPLYING
PSYCHOLOGY TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183, 198 (David Carson et al. eds., 2007).
34
R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A
Replication and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 337 (1989). Several other studies
have documented the impact of witness confidence on jurors’ judgments. E.g., Amy L.
Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A
Test of the Five Biggers Criteria, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 581, 590–92 (2000); Neil Brewer
& Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on MockJuror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361 (2002).
35
Lora L. Levett, Co-Witness Information Influences Whether a Witness is Likely to
Choose from a Lineup, 18 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 168, 178 (2013); C. A.
Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness
and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720–22 (1993).
36
Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002).
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feedback also distorts eyewitnesses’ retrospective judgments about their
opportunities to view the perpetrators, how much attention was paid, and
how easy it was to make identifications.37 Importantly, these are precisely
the sorts of judgments that the U.S. Supreme Court deems essential to
determining whether an identification based on suggestive procedures
should nonetheless be admissible, thereby compounding the bias.38
As both Simon and Devine point out, because witness confidence can
have a profound impact on jurors’ willingness to convict, these findings
suggest obvious and easily instituted reforms in the ways that eyewitnesses
are questioned and lineups are conducted. In Simon’s words:
All identification procedures should be “double-blind”: the administrator must be kept
unaware of the identity of the suspect; the witness should be informed that the
administrator does not know the suspect’s identity
The administrator should refrain from any communication or behavior that could be
interpreted as suggestive or revealing of the identity of the suspect
The witness should announce his recognition or non-recognition, followed
immediately by a confidence statement. The witness should not be given feedback
39
before completing the statement.

Returning to the question of how extensive these and other procedural
changes should be, some proposed revisions are surely heavy-handed.
These include suggestions that because jurors have difficulty translating
qualitative assessments into monetary awards, particularly for punitive
damages,40 judges should be used in their place.41 Other proposals are far
37
Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A
Meta-Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
859, 864–65 (2006).
38
See generally Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness
Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness
Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009) (discussing and critiquing
suggestive identification procedures).
39
SIMON, supra note 4, at 83.
40
See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 34 (2004); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards:
The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 64–66 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),
107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2110 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167–70 (2002). But see rejoinders by Theodore Eisenberg and
colleagues, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 763–65 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the
Mass of Awards, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
105, 115 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008).
41
Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance
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less draconian. Examples include urging judges to become aware of
prospective jurors’ difficulties in gauging their own susceptibilities to bias
and to remain skeptical of jurors’ assurances of impartiality, a common
occurrence during voir dire. Still other proposals—for example, that jury
instructions be drafted without legalese and that judges provide jurors with
helpful responses when asked to clarify the law—are somewhere between
these two extremes. Some of these proposals for reducing bias, such as
double-blind lineups and more comprehensible jury instructions, would
effectively improve the quality of legally relevant decisionmaking. Other
reforms, such as requiring eyewitnesses to make immediate confidence
judgments or making judges more aware of juror bias, would not
necessarily stop predictable irrationality in its tracks. Nonetheless, they
would enable the authorities (e.g., police investigators, judges) to place the
proper weight on decisions made by witnesses and jurors, thereby indirectly
improving the functioning of the system as a whole.
Behavioral decision theorists, in particular, tend to distrust the abilities
of various legal decisionmakers and instead favor increased bureaucratic
control of their judgments.42 But the consequence of such paternalistic
interventions is reduced reliance on the collective wisdom of the very
people entrusted to judge the actions of others. Is there a more restrained
and nuanced way to bring legal decisions in line with deductive logic and
rational choice theory?
III. NUDGING DECISIONMAKING IN THE LAW
Both legal scholars and economists43 have advocated for subtly
restructuring legal decisions to allow for different thought processes to
predominate and thereby to prevent distortions created by cognitive errors.
One version of this perspective, outlined in the influential book Nudge:
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness,44 urges
policymakers to consider cognitive biases that are likely to hold sway and
to design “choice architectures” through which decisions are structured and
as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 916–17 (1998); Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not
Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 207–15 (1998). Yet judges
seem prone to the same cognitive errors that affect jurors. See Guthrie et al., supra note 19,
at 819–21; Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999
ILL. L. REV. 363, 386–87, 396 (1999).
42
Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 511 (1983); Michael D. Green, Negligence =
Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (1997).
43
See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1546 (1998).
44
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17–39.
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choices are described in ways that acknowledge these biases. According to
Nudge, this work is to be done by “choice architects” whose expertise
allows them to design situations in which decisionmakers can make better
choices.45 The notion of choice architecture has caused a significant stir in
academic circles46 and has been implemented in several real-world contexts
in which people make less-than-optimal choices, including healthcare,
charitable giving, financial planning, and environmental protection. In each
of these contexts, choice architects have “nudged” people by imperceptibly
changing the decisionmaking task to prompt them to make better choices.
Though not explicitly advocating that the legal system be nudged,
Thaler and Sunstein would agree, we believe, that psychological science as
offered up by Devine and Simon is inherently relevant to legal decisions
and could be used to render those decisions fairer. In fact, we suspect that
the economist, lawyer, and psychologist mingling at that cocktail party
could easily engage around the notion of nudges in the law, debating the
right and wrong ways to nudge, and pondering the ethical and legal
consequences of revising the system based on science. We use the
remainder of this Review to explore the ways that nudging could be gently
used to benefit jury decisionmaking (à la Devine) and the criminal justice
process more broadly (à la Simon).
The authors of Nudge, economist Richard H. Thaler and legal scholar
Cass R. Sunstein, suggest that nudging can be most beneficial when wouldbe nudgers have much more “expertise” than decision makers themselves,
when the context includes “decisions that are difficult, complex, and
infrequent, and when [decisionmakers] have poor feedback and few
opportunities for learning.”47 These conditions are virtually synonymous
with most jury trials, given that in contrast to professional (or even lay)
judges,48 jurors typically are selected for their lack of expertise. In the
overwhelming majority of instances, they serve in only one trial, are given
no feedback on whether the judge or other “experts” would have reached
Id. at 3.
See, e.g., P. Dolan et al., Influencing Behavior: The Mindspace Way, J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 264, 265 (2012); Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not
to Nudge, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 123, 123 (2010); Evan Selinger & Kyle Powys Whyte,
Competence and Trust in Choice Architecture, 23 KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 461, 462
(2010); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Book Review, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral
Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2118–24 (2009).
47
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 247.
48
Although lay participation in legal decisionmaking is, on the whole, declining, some
countries outside the United States are experiencing success with lay judges. See, e.g.,
Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making, 25 LAW &
POL’Y 83, 87, 88–89 (2003).
45
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the same conclusion, and often have to grapple with difficult material.
A prerequisite for nudging is recognition of the judgmental biases that
are likely to arise in various situations and of the details about how they can
derail rational decisionmaking. Fortunately, on these issues Devine and
Simon have done the heavy lifting for us. For example, Devine explains
that when jurors are exposed to inadmissible evidence during trial and
instructed to ignore it, they are unable to do so, particularly when the
evidence fits with the narrative they favor at the time.49 Judges typically
forge ahead after giving such a directive, with little apparent concern that
they just highlighted and underscored the very information they want jurors
to disregard. Does choice architecture suggest a better way? Declaring a
mistrial and issuing a directed verdict are rarely used (and in the case of
mistrials, inefficient) remedies, so attention should focus on preventing
exposure to inadmissible evidence in the first place. But it is a staple of
televised legal dramas—and probably real trials as well—for attorneys to
introduce evidence that they know will be objected to and declared
inadmissible, hoping that once the genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put
back in. Devine suggests that preventing exposure can be achieved by
various preemptive moves, including increasing the sanctions for attorneys
who solicit inadmissible testimony and vetting any questionable material in
pretrial hearings or sidebars. Otherwise stated, by nudging the attorneys.
Similarly, Simon describes how confirmation bias in the context of
criminal investigations can lead to tunnel vision, whereby a suspect’s mere
status as “suspect” early in the investigation can cause investigators to
search solely for additional evidence supportive of the suspect’s guilt and to
ignore evidence either of his innocence or of another party’s guilt.50 The
bias can lead not only to false convictions (a bad outcome for the innocent
suspect) but also to a failure to apprehend the real perpetrators (a bad
outcome for other potential victims and society as a whole). Simon
recommends combating the bias by implementing strategies (i.e., nudges)
such as “promoting a healthy skepticism” and encouraging and welcoming
the generation of alternative hypotheses.51
Choice architects can also influence decisionmaking by varying the
49
For an excellent meta-analysis on this point, see Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on
Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis,
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2006).
50
SIMON, supra note 4, at 24.
51
Id. at 45. Simon notes that procedures along these lines already exist in the United
Kingdom and Canada. He also observes that motivational biases limit the effectiveness of
debiasing in certain situations such as criminal investigations. Id. Nonetheless, it might be
just the sort of nudge that can tip an investigation from an inaccurate to an accurate outcome.
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structure of the choice task.52 One means of accomplishing this is by
determining the optimal number and ordering of choice options that will lead to
both rational and preferred outcomes without overwhelming decisionmakers’
cognitive capabilities. There are no formulae or recipes for doing so, and the
nature of any restructuring will depend on the particular task. But some general
recommendations apply, including considering decisionmakers’ willingness to
engage in the task fully, their familiarity with important components of various
choices, and the complexity of the task.
The importance of task complexity is seen in the results of studies that
examine how the consolidation of increasing numbers of plaintiffs in complex
tort cases affects jurors’ abilities to reach fair and predictable outcomes to each
plaintiff. In one study, mock jurors were able to award compensatory damages
consistent with the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries from exposure to contaminated
groundwater when the trial involved only four plaintiffs, but they were unable to
make appropriate distinctions among those same four plaintiffs when their cases
were consolidated with four additional plaintiffs at trial.53 Increasing the number
of plaintiffs beyond four increased the amount of evidence that jurors had to
process and impaired their abilities to attend to each plaintiff’s unique evidence
in a particularized manner. These findings provide a clear suggestion to choice
architects—such as trial judges—to be wary of the consequences of consolidating
multiple parties in the same trial for the sake of efficiency: jurors’ cognitive
abilities are quickly overwhelmed and less-than-optimal decisions can result.
This example, and others like it, raise the question of whom, exactly, the
choice architects in the legal arena should be. Trial court judges are perhaps the
most obvious choice, as they have so much control over issues that can enhance
or impair trial fairness, such as joinder/severance, consolidation, and
admissibility of evidence. Judges are also impartial, at least theoretically, which
lends them an aura of credibility as nudgers, compared to, say, attorneys.
However, to the extent that judges themselves are susceptible to cognitive
biases,54 they might not be in the best position to nudge jurors toward better
decisions.
Simon argues that effective reform is difficult because of “two important
mindsets that help sustain the process despite its limited accuracy: the
marginalization of factual accuracy and the denial of the process’s
shortcomings.”55 By this, he means that the adversarial process often places
52
Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 MARKETING
LETTERS 487, 488–90 (2012).
53
Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Effects of Trial Complexity on Decision Making, 81 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 757, 761–64 (1996).
54
See Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 819–21.
55
SIMON, supra note 4, at 209.
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procedural rights above accurate verdicts, and that faith in the effectiveness of
those procedural safeguards discourages openness to reform. Given the
pervasiveness of these mindsets, more than nudging might be necessary.
Policymakers such as state supreme courts and legislatures would seem to
be in better positions to serve as choice architects than those in the trenches, like
judges and police officers. These rule-making bodies have the power to
promulgate evidence-based criminal justice procedures. For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice under Attorney General Janet Reno issued guidelines for
federal law enforcement to follow in conducting lineup identifications.56 More
recently, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey57 and Oregon58 have adopted
evidence-based procedures for determining the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence; and in late 2012, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a
new jury instruction on eyewitness identification, the purpose of which is to help
jurors in weighing eyewitness testimony.59 Explicit policies like these might be
somewhat stronger than the type of gentle nudge envisioned by Thaler and
Sunstein; nonetheless, they will be subtle enough when applied to actual
witnesses and jurors in the field, and they are likely to have a salubrious effect.

IV. CONCLUSION
The new books by Simon and Devine can be read in either a pessimistic or
an optimistic light. The pessimistic take is that the reasoning engaged in by
jurors and other players in the American justice system is fraught with bias and
irrationality, which can lead to serious and potentially devastating consequences
like false convictions. The optimistic take is that many, and maybe even most of
these biases are—if not totally correctable—at least reducible. To get us there,
judges and other policymakers might need little more than a gentle nudge in the
right direction. Support for that idea comes from Thaler’s and Sunstein’s wellreasoned contention that nudging can improve decisionmaking in many realms.
We have tried to show that nudges could also lead to enhanced decisions in the
law, and we commend Devine and Simon for providing examples of meaningful
nudges. If more behavioral scientists follow their examples, our cartoon
protagonists will have much to talk about for many years to come.
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